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Draining the Swamp:
The British Strategy
of Population Control
WADE MARKEL
“The first reaction to guerilla warfare must be to protect and control the
population.”
— Brigadier Richard L. Clutterbuck
The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency
in Malaya and Vietnam
“What the peasant wants to know is: does the government mean to win the
war? Because if not, he will have to support the insurgent.”
— Sir Robert Thompson
Defeating Communist Insurgency:
The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam
“When you’re up to your ass in alligators, it’s hard to remember that you came
to drain the swamp.”
— Anon.

T

hirty years after the end of the Vietnam War, the United States and its
Army again find themselves confronted with a tenacious insurgency, this
time in Iraq. Given our decidedly mixed record in counterinsurgency operations, we tend to look elsewhere for successful models. Many look to the British, especially their exemplary and thorough victory in Malaya, to provide
such a model.1 Commentators cite the British Army’s superior organizational
adaptability and flexibility, strategic patience, their predilection for using the
minimum force necessary, the relative ease with which they integrated civil
and military aspects of national power, and the apparent facility with which
they adapted their strategies to local circumstances of geography and culture.
We would indeed do well to emulate the aforementioned characteristics of British counterinsurgency practice, but there was more to British suc-
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cess in Malaya than a good attitude. The key element of their success was the
effective internment of the Chinese “squatter” population, the segment of Malayan society from which the insurgents almost entirely drew their strength.2
By interning the “squatters” in fortified “New Villages,” the British and their
Malayan allies were able to deny the communist insurgents access to recruits,
food, and military supplies. It also allowed them to narrow the scope of their intelligence efforts, as the insurgents had to maintain contact with their base under the very noses of the Anglo-Malayan government.
This strategy was liable to abuse. In Kenya, against the contemporary Mau Mau rebellion, the British employed the same strategy as they had in
Malaya, in this case interning basically all of the ethnic Kikuyu. The system
of detention camps and fortified villages quickly degenerated into what historian Caroline Elkins has called “Britain’s Gulag in Kenya.”3 Eventually, the
ensuing scandal forced Britain to grant independence even more rapidly than
the accelerating pressures of decolonization would have anyway. Still, the colonial administration was able to defeat a much larger and more widely supported insurgency, more quickly, than it had in Malaya.
A strategy of population control was not invariably effective, however. In Vietnam, the Diem regime’s British-advised and American-supported
attempt to implement this strategy, the Strategic Hamlet program, not only
failed to weaken the insurgency but actually exacerbated popular resistance.
On the other hand, the situation in Vietnam differed significantly from that in
Malaya and Kenya. In contrast to the insurgent movements in those two countries, isolated both from external support and concentrated in a socially distinct
minority, the Viet Cong enjoyed robust external support from North Vietnam
and at least minimal legitimacy among the ethnically homogeneous South
Vietnamese. Indeed, it was Diem’s power base, the minority Catholic community, that was in danger of being isolated.
As troubling as it might be, the evidence suggests that the main lesson to be drawn from the British practice of counterinsurgency is that physical control of the contested segment of the population is essential. Further,
that control is greatly facilitated when the insurgency’s support is concentrated among a small and relatively unpopular minority of the population.4
When that condition obtains, as it did in Malaya and Kenya, a strategy of population control can succeed. When conditions are different, as they were in
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Vietnam, this strategy will fail. In Iraq today, the situation resembles that
which obtained in Malaya and Kenya more than it resembles conditions in
Vietnam. A strategy of population control could therefore be applied, provided it was modified to account for local circumstances and the evolution in
international mores.

Draining the Swamp: Controlling the
Chinese “Squatters” in Malaya
According to US Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl and others, British authorities in Malaya took some time even to realize that they were beset with
communist “alligators” before realizing that only “draining the swamp” could
eliminate them. This they did by systematically concentrating the Chinese squatter population, roughly 500,000 of Malaya’s 1950s population of approximately
5,000,000, into fortified and tightly controlled “New Villages.” Denied effective
access to supporters and supplies, the insurgency melted away. Physical control
and security thus put the British in an advantageous position that their subsequent and much-praised military and intelligence operations merely exploited.
Over the period between the implementation of the Briggs Plan in 1951 and the
granting of Malaya’s independence in 1957, this strategy of population control
broke the back of the communist insurgency.
According to Lieutenant General John Coates of the Australian Army, the Malayan insurgency benefited almost as much from British inattention and ineptitude as its own inherent strength. In his operational analysis of
the Malayan Emergency, Coates discovered that the British mostly relied on
the communists’ commitment to disarm and join the political process in the
immediate postwar period. Officials blithely ignored barely concealed subversion until the scope and scale of communist attacks compelled the government in London to intervene. By that time, insurgents were killing almost 200
civilians, police, and officials a month.5
British inattention had obscured the insurgency’s weaknesses. Most
important, the Communist Party was never able to broaden its appeal beyond
the Chinese squatters, comprising about one tenth of Malaya’s population.6
The squatters, as their name suggests, lived in ramshackle communities in the
jungle, on land to which they had no legitimate title. The indigenous Malays
bore little love for the Chinese, originally imported by the British to work in
Malaya’s rubber plantations and tin mines under stringent limitations. Moreover, while all ethnic Chinese resented the Malays’ entrenched advantages,
those in the urban and entrepreneurial classes had little yearning for a socialist utopia. Even most of the squatters were far more concerned with material
improvements in their lives than with establishing a new political order.7
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“There is nothing controversial about
combating an insurgency by
improving the lot of the population.”

Thus the communists were left depending upon a minority of a minority to accomplish the revolution.
For that reason, it was relatively simple to isolate the insurgency
physically and politically. Sir Robert Thompson, a Malaya veteran who later
went on to advise the Diem regime in Vietnam, noted how important it was
that Malaya’s short border with friendly Thailand could be sealed easily.8
Within Malaya, it was a matter of denying insurgents access to potential
sources of support. Understanding that squatters constituted both the insurgency’s base of support and its Achilles’ heel, the Anglo-Malayan government moved to bring them firmly under government control. Sir Harold
Rawdon Briggs, appointed Director of Operations in 1950, is generally credited with realizing that controlling the population was essential to defeating
the insurgency. Over the next two years, the British relocated the entire squatter population into approximately 423 “New Villages,” intended to be inaccessible to the communist guerillas.9
The government did more than put barbed wire and entrenchments
between the insurgents and the squatters; it neutralized the desire to support
the insurgents. Briggs conceived of the counterinsurgency campaign as a
“competition in government,” which informed the location, design, and organization of the New Villages. First, the government attempted to minimize
disruption to community life. Whenever possible, the British relied upon
regroupment, in which existing communities were consolidated and fortified,
resettling or moving everyone only when absolutely necessary. In either case,
life in the resulting New Village represented a significant improvement over
the squatters’ ramshackle jungle dwellings. The government provided better
infrastructure, ensuring access to medical care and education. Another key
difference was that the squatters now had a formal right to the land on which
they lived. These small but significant steps eliminated many of the grievances which had animated the squatters, thereby depriving the insurgents of
considerable support.10
There is nothing controversial about combating an insurgency by
improving the lot of the population, but there was a substantial element of re38
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pression to the strategy as well. Access to each New Village was tightly controlled. Villagers were subject to search upon exit and entry. Smuggling food,
medicine, or other militarily useful items was subject to severe punishment.
Frequently it did not come to that. Instead, those caught smuggling often led
the authorities to the guerillas in order to avoid punishment. Enforcing these
and other emergency regulations was the responsibility of the police, mostly
ethnic Malays, who were not inclined to align themselves with the Chinese,
let alone with the communists. Usually the police detachment would also include one or more ethnic Chinese Special Branch officers, responsible for ferreting out subversive elements within the community itself. The police detachment also would be responsible for defending the community, assisted by
a “Home Guard” drawn from the community itself. The formation of this
Home Guard not only removed a manpower burden from government forces,
it also actively involved squatter communities on the side of the government.
The army assumed responsibility only for operations outside the wire, being
distributed so as to be able to rapidly reinforce villages in the event of attack.
Overseeing the integration of the different elements were top-flight administrators, many of whom spoke Chinese and had been drawn from throughout
the British Empire.11
The government then focused on destroying the insurgency, conducting a campaign of indirect approach. Instead of concentrating immediately
upon the areas where the insurgency was strongest, Sir Gerald Templer,
Briggs’ successor, focused on building support for the government where the
insurgency was weak. Such a policy had the advantages of gradually accreting
strength to the government through enhanced economic activity. It also created
the appearance of momentum, and it created a favorable contrast with conditions in areas troubled by insurgents. Of course, this policy affronted businessmen and officials in areas where the communists were strong. When, in
response to their entreaties, the government attempted to attack the guerillas
directly, such operations were rarely decisive.12
Establishing the New Villages required not only physical infrastructure but a legal one as well. The Emergency Regulations of 1948 and 1949 that
established the New Villages gave the government significant powers: control
of food, which it could ration or restrict as a form of collective punishment; unlimited police powers of search and seizure; the ability to detain suspects indefinitely or deport without trial; and, obviously, the right to forcibly resettle
populations. Death was the penalty for many of the more serious infractions of
these regulations. Such measures affront modern sensibilities and undoubtedly
led to some abuses. For instance, Anglo-Malayan government did impose collective punishment, albeit sparingly. One of Sir Gerald Templer’s first acts as
High Commissioner was to impose a 22-hour-a-day curfew on the rebel strongSpring 2006
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hold of Tanjong Malim, simultaneously halving its food ration.13 Even unwitting mistakes could have drastic consequences. General John Coates regrets
the fate of Malayan aborigines, resettled to protect them from insurgent intimidation, noting in passing that “thousands died.”14
On the other hand, the procedural protections to which Western society was accustomed, even in 1950, would have proved unworkable against an
insurgent campaign of murder and intimidation. As the quotation from Sir
Robert Thompson at the beginning of this article indicates, the government’s
determination to win, and its willingness to take the measures necessary to
prevail, will often determine the allegiance of the uncommitted. While such
broad and severe measures were essential to controlling the insurgency, Malayan veteran Brigadier Richard Clutterbuck argued that it was equally important that these powers were formally spelled out and impartially applied.
Such formalities replaced the potential perception of government actions as
arbitrary and abusive with an understanding that the government was strict
but effective. They also ensured that the Anglo-Malayan actions went no further than the British government and elites within Malayan society were willing to support.15
The tight control over the Chinese squatters was the decisive element
in British strategy. It enabled the other aspects of that strategy which recent
analysts have praised so much. In the words of Thompson, describing the
general application of such a strategy, “The ‘hold’ aspect of operations is undoubtedly the most crucial and the most complex, involving as it does the establishment of a solid security framework covering the whole population
living in the villages and small towns of a given area.”16 Access control and surveillance identified insurgent supporters. Officials could then exploit these individuals to find their contacts both in the jungle and in the villages, enabling
the intelligence-directed operations, for instance. Isolating the population
forced the insurgents to reveal themselves if they wanted access to that population, and greatly complicated the insurgent task in mobilizing the population.
The results speak for themselves. By 1957, insurgent strength had
declined from its estimated peak of 8,000 in 1952 to a total of 2,000, of which
only about 200 were active combatants. Attacks plunged from a monthly
peak of about 100 in 1952 to about 20 in 1957. The insurgency, of course, did
not merely wither. Exploiting the favorable conditions created by population
control through offensive operations to kill or capture insurgents still took
several years. Because the government had control of the population, however, the insurgency could not make good its losses. But while victory could
be measured in 1957, the decisive point had been reached in 1952. As
Clutterbuck put it, “The government had won a major victory, though this was
not to become apparent until the middle of the following year [1953].”17
40

Parameters

Incurring Moral Hazard: Suppressing the Mau Mau
The British applied the same strategy in Kenya to combat the Mau
Mau insurgency, which officially lasted from 1952 to 1956, but they applied it
with a far heavier hand. Like the communists in Malaya, the Mau Mau in
Kenya drew their support almost exclusively from one ethnic minority, the
Kikuyu. As in Malaya, the British overlooked the Mau Mau’s considerable
growth in strength and support until several spectacular murders forced the colonial administration to acknowledge its existence. At that point, the government overreacted. Sir Evelyn Baring, the newly appointed governor, imported
the Malayan model wholesale in order to combat the insurgency. Unfortunately, Baring’s government applied it without the sensitivity and restraint that
had characterized Britain’s conduct of the Malayan Emergency. At one point,
almost every Kikuyu male of military age had been detained, with the remaining Kikuyu interned in fortified villages. These villages resembled Malaya’s
New Villages, but without the amenities. An earlier passage in this article noted
Caroline Elkins’ characterization of the resulting system as “Britain’s Gulag in
Kenya.” Historian David Anderson, in his Histories of the Hanged, asserts that
the colonial regime “became a police state in the very fullest sense of that
term.”18 In the end, Britain’s domestic reaction to revelations of the nature and
scope of the brutality accelerated Britain’s retreat from empire, much as revelations of torture soured the French public on the war in Algeria. For all that,
Baring’s government had effectively crushed the Mau Mau by then, and had
done so using the colony’s internal resources. Britain’s suppression of the Mau
Mau thus teaches us how a population control strategy can get out of hand. It
also supports the troubling conclusion that it is control of a given population,
and not cultural sensitivity toward it, that was the decisive aspect of the British
practice of counterinsurgency.
Britain’s victory in Kenya was due in no small part to the structural vulnerabilities of the insurgency. At first glance, the Mau Mau may seem to have
posed a much more formidable threat than the squatters in Malaya. The Mau
Mau had gained a much stronger hold over Kenya’s 1.5 million Kikuyu than the
communists had over Malaya’s ethnic Chinese. Elkins asserts that almost all of
those 1.5 million people had taken some form of the Mau Mau oath to expel the
British or die trying. Actual combatants numbered around 20,000 at the peak of
the insurgency, though how many of these were effective fighters remains open
to question.19 Yet the Mau Mau’s success in mobilizing the Kikuyu apparently
came at the cost of alienating Kenya’s other groups. To be sure, their goals of
ejecting the British and redistributing British-held land enjoyed wide support.
The Mau Mau, however, failed to advance a political program for what would replace British domination, or even a strategy for ejecting them. This failure preSpring 2006
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vented them from drawing support from other segments of Kenyan society, who
dreaded the prospect of Kikuyu domination even more than they detested the
British overlordship. Finally, in contrast to the Malayan communists, who could
draw upon their World War II experience of guerilla warfare against the Japanese, the Mau Mau lacked either the experience of or any preparation for guerilla
warfare. Their attacks thus consisted mostly of small-scale massacres of isolated
white settlers, and, more frequently, Africans. Structurally, the Mau Mau could
wreak havoc, but not forge a revolution.20
The Mau Mau’s failure to broaden their appeal allowed the British to
isolate the Kikuyu from the rest of Kenyan society, and to draw resources from
that society to suppress the rebellion. Drawing on the example of Malaya,
Baring enacted wide-ranging emergency regulations to enable him to combat
the insurgency. He established a network of fortified villages for the purpose of
isolating guerilla fighters from their base of support. As in Malaya, these villages were supposed to represent an improvement over previous communities.
Unlike Malaya, there were not enough resources available to realize this intent.
The inhabitants of these villages, mostly women, children, and the elderly,
were forced to build the villages themselves.
Conditions in those villages were brutal. The Home Guard, recruited
from Kikuyu loyalists or ethnic rivals of the Kikuyu, treated the inhabitants as
spoils of war. Rape, murder, and other forms of despoliation and maltreatment were not uncommon. As for the men, most were either fighting in the
jungle or under detention. At the high point of the insurgency, 70,000 Kikuyu
were in detention camps, where conditions were even worse. While one
might question Caroline Elkins’ tenuously supported estimate of 100,000
deaths, it is probable that a great many civilians lost their lives in detention
camps and fortified villages. These conditions constituted a very real stain on
Britain’s honor, and the revelations over the extent of the abuse occasioned
public outrage. The Macmillan government, already unsentimentally committed to wholesale decolonization, accelerated Kenya’s autonomy as a result
of popular uproar over the so-called “Hola River Massacre” in 1959, in which
several inmates were murdered.21
Perhaps the most horrifying aspect of this system of abuse was that it
arose through neglect, not intention. Even the impassioned Elkins is unwilling to attribute the cruel conduct of the Kenyan counterinsurgency primarily
to malice aforethought, attributing much of the result to the lack of resources.
Unlike Malaya, Kenya could not claim to be part of the Cold War. Thus Governor Baring had to make do with the colony’s own financial and human resources, especially the fairly racist and highly self-interested white settler
population. These settlers were more likely to take vengeance than to ameliorate legitimate grievances. The much larger population to be controlled also
42
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placed a much greater strain on available resources. Most important, Baring
had considerably less room to conciliate the insurgents. In contrast to the situation in Malaya, Baring was responsible for maintaining Britain’s somewhat
unjust colonial domination, a goal to which few Kenyans could subscribe
from altruism. Thus instead of enlisting support, Baring had to buy it with
whatever he could expropriate from suspected rebels. All this made the conflict especially and unnecessarily cruel.22
Even so, these tactics broke the Mau Mau. With independence, power
passed peacefully to Jomo Kenyatta. While Kenyatta had been falsely imprisoned for fomenting their rebellion, he had in truth steadfastly refused any connection with the Mau Mau, even while in prison. Out of prison and in power,
he continued to grant former Mau Mau neither credit for independence nor
a share of power in post-independence Kenya. Kenya remained a member of
the Commonwealth of Nations. With constrained resources and flawed instruments, Baring had defeated an insurgency of larger scope and greater appeal
than the one that had challenged the British in Malaya. He had also deeply compromised Britain’s moral status.23

Vietnam: The Failure of the Strategic Hamlet Program
One place where a strategy of population control did not work was
Vietnam. Of course, given the war’s ultimate result, it is hard to argue that
anything else did, either. In the early 1960s, things looked different, however.
Hoping to replicate Britain’s success in Malaya, South Vietnamese President
Ngo Dinh Diem initiated the Strategic Hamlet program under the direction of
his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. Diem relied heavily on advice he got from Sir
Robert Thompson, who had played a prominent role as a member of Sir Gerald Templer’s administration in Malaya. Thompson and others would later argue that Diem implemented the plan poorly, striving for quantity over quality.
The speed and scope with which people were transferred into these fortified
camps ensured that the process not only alienated the peasantry whose support Diem was trying to gain, but also was ineffective in the end.24 In any
event, America abandoned the Strategic Hamlet program with the Diem regime after the November 1963 coup, narrowing its focus to the formidable
challenge of defeating the People’s Army of Vietnam and main force Viet
Cong maneuver formations. This approach, often referred to as the strategy of
attrition, proved an even bigger mistake in the end.
Yet while no counterinsurgency strategy attempted in Vietnam
proved ultimately successful, those which eventually showed promise contained many of the same elements. The Marine Corps’ Combined Assistance
Platoon program, largely successful where applied, focused on providing
security to villagers by embedding Marine squads in local village militias,
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and the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)
program of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) achieved
limited success by coordinating security and civic action at the village level
in a manner reminiscent of Malaya’s New Villages.25 Yet if these initiatives
produced any success, it was not enough to enable South Vietnam to gain the
internal strength and cohesion required to resist North Vietnamese conquest
indefinitely.
The most compelling explanation for the failure of the Strategic
Hamlet program lay in Vietnam’s vastly different recent history, geography,
and demography. In contrast to the relatively weak Malayan communists or
the Mau Mau, the Viet Cong could build on the remnants of the Viet Minh insurgency that had defeated the French. Moreover, the Viet Cong were vigorously and continuously supported by North Vietnam, unlike the Malayans
and the Mau Mau, who largely had to fend for themselves. Most important, it
was the Diem regime, and not the insurgents, that drew its strength from a distinct minority of the population, the Vietnamese Catholics, while the communists took special care not to alienate the Buddhist majority. Indeed, deriving
their lineage from the Viet Minh, the National Liberation Front proved better
able to lay claim to a legitimizing nationalist ideology.

Conclusion: Applying the British Model Today
The results of this comparative historical analysis are troubling. In
Malaya, Sir Harold Briggs and his successor, Gerald Templer, combined a
strategy of population control with an effective “hearts and minds” campaign
to better the living conditions of the Chinese squatters, breaking the back of the
insurgency in about five years. In Kenya, Evelyn Baring executed a far crueler
version of the strategy employed in Malaya. There, the violence and brutality
of repression clearly outweighed the feeble and poorly resourced attempts to
win Kikuyu “hearts and minds.” Nonetheless, the Mau Mau were essentially
broken in four years. This comparison suggests that the vital element in both
counterinsurgency efforts was the effective internment of the subject populations, and not efforts at social amelioration. While we would like to believe that
“winning hearts and minds” is both important and effective, these examples
suggest that the effort is neither essential nor decisive. Instead, what will determine success in counterinsurgency is how effectively the insurgent may be denied access to his base of support. The question is whether this analysis has any
bearing on our current situation, especially in Iraq.
It may not. The situation there differs considerably from that which
obtained in 1950s Malaya and Kenya. Iraq’s military geography is considerably more challenging. Like Vietnam, and unlike either Malaya or Kenya, Iraq
shares long and porous borders with neighboring states—in this case Syria and
44
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Iran, neither of which favors the emergence of a democratic, Western-oriented
Iraq. Foreign fighters flow over these borders virtually unhindered. There are
also a lot more people in Iraq. There are almost as many Sunni Arabs as there
were Malayans. Moreover, unlike Malaya’s small and easily sequestered villages, Iraq’s population largely resides in relatively large, contiguous urban areas. Samarra, Falluja, and Tal Afar, all scenes of recent combat, each number
about 200,000 or more. The United Nations estimates that Iraq is about 79 percent urbanized.26 Breaking these cities down into manageable and defensible
units would present considerable challenges in implementation. At a more fundamental level, even with our Iraqi partners, we don’t have enough administrators, police, and soldiers with a sufficient working knowledge of Iraqi society
and culture. Such administrators and police were critical to Britain’s victory in
Malaya in the 1950s.
Most important, there is one critical difference—and it is that our current strategy is showing signs of succeeding. Iraq’s third successful election in
the course of one year provides evidence that we and the Iraqis are successfully
isolating the insurgents politically, if not physically. In particular, vigorous
Sunni participation indicates a move away from violence toward participation
in the political process. The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq states that
progress on the political front has led ordinary Iraqis to provide better intelligence on insurgent activity. According to the Brookings Institution’s December 2005 Iraq Index, such tips reached an all-time high in November. More
important, the Iraqis’ increasing commitment to the political process has led to
an increasing and tangible commitment to the Iraqi state. In a key indicator, recruiting for Iraqi security forces continues to outpace requirements. Moreover,
according to Lieutenant General David Petraeus, those security forces are increasingly capable of independent operations.27
Iraq resembles Malaya in one critical respect, however: the insurgency
is concentrated in one social minority, the Sunni Arab population, and lacks
broader appeal to Iraq’s other constituent elements.28 Clearly, not all Sunnis support the insurgency, either actively or tacitly, but there is reason to believe that
some Sunni elites are attempting to leverage the insurgency to lay claim to a disproportionate share of Iraq’s political power and wealth.29 And while recent polls
indicate that a majority of Iraqis want an end to the US occupation, that shared
aspiration does not necessarily translate into support for the insurgency. The evident aims of the insurgency—a return to Sunni dominance, perhaps tinged with
the imposition of a harsh Sunni religious orthodoxy—inspire opposition rather
than support among Iraq’s majority Shia population and ethnic Kurds.
Unfortunately, another key similarity is that the insurgency has
steadily gained in strength and effectiveness, just as the Malayan insurgency
grew in the years before 1952. Estimates of insurgent strength have climbed
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from about 5,000 in the summer of 2003 to a current figure that hovers between
15,000 and 20,000, though the increase does appear to have leveled off recently. Moreover, the insurgency continues to grow in sophistication and effectiveness. Average daily attacks have reached a high of between 80 and 100.
While monthly US casualties are below their peaks in April and November
2004, the general trend has been upward, as it has for the number of Iraqi civilian dead.30 Just as the British experienced in the early stages of Malaya, we find
ourselves clearing an area of insurgents only to find ourselves returning to the
same place to fight a different group of insurgents later on.31 These facts may
dictate a willingness to consider a modified strategic concept of intensified
population control.
Now is not the time to implement such a strategy, however, and we
should refrain from doing so as long as current methods continue to show
signs of progress. In the short term, a policy of internment might well engender more support for the insurgency. International opinion would not stand
for interning Iraq’s Sunni Arab population, and US soldiers might well balk at
forcing civilians into internment camps. Unless explained very effectively to
Americans, it probably also would erode domestic support for the war. It is an
option—but one that need not be exercised immediately.
If events recommend a change in strategy, however, it might be possible to entice Sunnis into internment voluntarily, as an alternative preferable to
being continually fought over. The Sunni Arab community is not monolithic.
As several analysts have pointed out, tribes are actually the dominant organizing unit for Iraqi society.32 Some Sunni tribes can undoubtedly be won over to
support of the government, just as the British managed to fracture ethnic solidarity among the Chinese in Malaya. By submitting to a regimen of tighter control, such communities could avoid becoming a battleground and get better
access to reconstruction aid. Rather than being imprisoned in internment
camps, the Sunnis would be joining “gated communities” with enhanced security and perhaps better access to reconstruction support. The key is keeping
such communities small enough to deny insurgents the ability to infiltrate them
and coerce support from the inhabitants. In effect, these Sunni communities
would be opting out of the war. Such “opting out” would work in our favor, by
progressively narrowing the insurgents’ potential base of support. Foreign
fighters would have fewer places to hide, as they would no longer be able to
simply move in anywhere and coerce the silence of neighbors. Though this
strategy would not eliminate insurgent freedom of action, it would narrow its
scope, allowing US and Iraqi security forces to concentrate their assets on unsecured areas. Moreover, just as it did in Malaya, the establishment of secured
communities should facilitate the collection of intelligence. Controlling this
population would simultaneously strike at the source of the insurgency and
46
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contribute to convincing large sections of the Sunni minority that their war is
over. Such a system would comprise an important element of our continually
evolving strategy, whose security component is “clear, hold, and build.” The
core of US strategy would still remain fostering democratic political institutions, effective security forces, and a robust economy.
We neither can nor should impose this strategy upon the Iraqis. It
must be their choice, and it probably should be their choice of last resort. Only
the Iraqis could hammer out the necessary compromises to ensure that a strategy of stringent population control gains and retains popular legitimacy. Our
role would be to help the Iraqis develop a workable plan, and to support them
in its execution. If this strategy were to be implemented, however, it would be
vital that we help provide the resources necessary to prevent the strategy from
degenerating into mere repression, as it did in Kenya. It should go without
saying that this strategy would have to be very carefully explained to the
American public, to the world, and especially to the Iraqis, so that everyone
would understand why they are doing it and what they hope to achieve.
The time may come when the Iraqi majority is no longer satisfied with
the extent of voluntary cooperation offered the Sunni Arab community. If the
insurgents continue to strike at will, and if the Sunni community persists in its
active and tacit support of the insurgency, the Shiite and Kurdish majority may
cease to tolerate a situation in which their alternatives are enduring torment and
terror indefinitely or submitting to domination by a detested minority. If that
point is reached, involuntary internment may prove to be the least bad remaining humane alternative. International opinion, which views with equanimity
the minority’s imposition of collective terror upon the majority, will undoubtedly oppose such a strategy as “collective punishment.” What the British practice of counterinsurgency suggests, however, is that it just might work.
NOTES
1. In this vein, General Peter Schoomaker commended Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl’s outstanding analysis of the British Army’s performance as a learning organization during the Malayan Emergency, Learning to
Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport: Praeger, 2002), to the
House Armed Services Committee in the summer of 2004. Nagl’s prescient study rose to prominence once we
found ourselves embroiled in Iraq. For other references to the British model, see Robert M. Cassidy, “The British Army in Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture,” Military Review, 85 (May/June 2005); or
James D. Campbell, “French Algeria and British Northern Ireland: Legitimacy and the Rule of Law in LowIntensity Conflict,” Military Review, 85 (March/April 2005).
2. See, for example, Richard Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 64.
3. Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry
Holt, 2005).
4. Experts in the field seem to realize this, but write only very obliquely about the subject. In Kalev Sepp,
“Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, 85 (May-June 2005), 8-12, Dr. Sepp lists population
control as a “best practice,” but limits his discussion to identity cards and other administrative measures. In
John A. Lynn, “Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, 85 (July-August 2005), 27,
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